Siraj Sikder Works: Some Points on Economic Operation (May 1973)

Siraj Sikder Works

Some Points on Economic Operation

(May 1973)

[Published by the Supreme Commanders’ Office of the Armed Patriotic Force—Sarbaharapath]

sikder

 Big type of economic operation is a critical commando or guerrilla attack.

These are more critical than ‘Attack and Disperse’ type operation because after attack these operations need to seize, stay sometimes to collect goods and then disperse with seized goods. Apart from that, operation occurs in cities in enemy areas where their communication system is developed. They are strong, and public support is difficult for us to be used on our favor.

This is why operation is to be carried very swiftly.

This type of operation requires higher level planners, solving of transport problem, activation of plan by the participants, professionalist efficiency and prudence that can tackle changed situation, and organizer to carry operation by combining those.

To make plan properly, it needs accurate investigation of our condition, terrain of target, transport system, condition of our enemy and people etc. On the basis of that, by considering al aspects and possibilities, make such plan that is about to sure to success.

Then comes guerrilla, arms, collection of transport, providing ideological training to guerrillas etc.

At last, carry operation by combining all the preparations.

There is lack of cadres and facilities to make those works done properly. This is why subjective condition (our condition) does not correspond to objective condition (target of operation and its terrain). Consequently, many operations fail.

○ A reason behind the operation’s failure is not carrying valuable advice of higher level in action and not taking their assistance.

This is why, before operation, take assistance from possible all on different aspects, and especially take assistance, advice and opinion from higher level.

○ Due to not huge work done and backward economic condition, huge number of drivers and mechanics (technicians) are not available among our cadres. This is also a reason behind the failure of operation.

Therefore, we have to appoint cadres in a planned manner to learn driving in cities, and work among drivers.

○ Because of not done huge work, always we do not get appropriate information from within economic target.

○ In many cases, organization and people’s support near operation was not utilized which resulted numerous losses to us. This is why before the operation, we have to manage to utilize local organization and people’s support.

○ In many cases, guerrillas of a place got danger while carrying operation in unknown other places.

This is why operation should be carried by local guerrillas. Despite outside guerrillas’ participation, local guerrillas should be included. Outside guerrillas should be made familiar with local condition by taking significant extent of time

○ In some cases, all the good and important commanders, guerrillas and commissars were either appointed or planned to appoint them.

It was not considered that what could be the losses of organization if participants of operation make or get danger, and what security might be endangered.

Due to the first reason, in some areas, losses were so high that those areas lost ability to do operation anymore later.

In some plans, such comrades were included that had they been in danger, organizational and military activities of a big region would stop.

As participants of operation got danger, in some regions, security was hampered, even other regions’ security also were hampered.

In case of arms too, sometimes it was not considered what would happen, if those are lost. So, later, there was no ability to carry operation anymore.

All these works are result of being guided by one-sidedness. It is the end of thinking of one-sidedly during operation without thinking long-term interest, whole situation and all sides.

○ Many operations’ failure comes from the inability of organizer’s consideration of how much the guerillas, commanders, commissars are able to materialize the plan.

○ During the operation, commanders cannot decide what to do in changed situation, which cause the failure of operation and the troops get endangered.

○ Repeated failure in operation one after another brings disappointment. This is why an operation should have long time well preparation, and be sure to success. It should be taken care so that failure comes after long lapse.

Smaller successful operations should be carried in-between bigger operations. It will keep courage high.

○ Systematize formality in arms-collection for operation, gathering, training, especially participating in operation, and collection of arms and seized goods after operation etc.

The first case will require organizer’s written approval while the 2nd case will need depositors’ signature.

○ The organizer himself and participants will gather at summation meeting after reading particular theories and sum up operation. They shall send operation sheet to higher level.

○ Seriously apply the summed up points in the next operations.

○ In some regions, guerrillas of military groups were not appointed in organizing military group, organizational group or any other organizational work. As a result, their standard have not developed, organizational conscience or revolutionary responsible mentality have not grown; have not achieved knowledge how to carry discipline and coordination, make plan and implement that, develop themselves as well as guerrillas and how to organize.

As a result, though many good comrade came in guerrilla group, their working capabilities were not properly utilized.

All the areas must leave that style and engage guerrillas in organizational work.

Those guerrillas who want to be whole timer, should be sent to other places by making them whole timer, otherwise they may transform to opportunist and backward.

Central Task, Firmly Grasping It and Some Guidelines regarding Operation

 

“Nor should a higher organization simultaneously assign any task to a lower organization without indicating their relative importance and urgency or without specifying which is central, for that will lead to confusion in the steps to be taken by the lower organization in their work and thus no definite results will be achieved.”

Chairman Mao further added, “In any given place, there cannot be a number of central tasks at the same time. At any one time there can be only one central task, supplemented by other task of a second or third order of importance. Consequently, the person with over-all responsibility in the locality must take into account the history and circumstances of the struggle there and put the different tasks in their proper order; he should not act upon each instructions as it comes from the higher organization without any planning of his own, and thereby create a multitude of “central tasks” and state of confusion and disorder…It is part of the art of leadership to take the whole situation into account and plan accordingly in the light of the historical conditions and existing circumstances of each locality, decide correctly on the center of gravity and the sequence of the work for each period, steadfastly carry through the decision, and make sure that definite results are achieved.” [1]

It is not enough to arrange order of central task, but also we should carry the following order of Chairman Mao Tsetung.

“‘Grasp firmly.’ That is to say, the Party committee must not merely “grasp”, but must “grasp firmly”, its main tasks. Once can get a grip on something only when it is grasped firmly, without the slightest slackening. Not to grasp firmly is not to grasp at all. Naturally, one cannot get a grip on something with an open hand. When the hand is clenched as if grasping something but is not clenched tightly, there is still no grip. Some of our comrades do grasp the main tasks, but their grasp is not firm and so they cannot make a success of their work. It will not do to have no grasp at all, nor will it do if the grasp is not firm.”

The Central Committee and leadership of the Proletarian Party of East Bengal fixed the principal task for various lower levels of party.

For example:

Economic operation is the central task in military field, and in ideological-organizational field it is anti-clique struggle and rectification campaign. In politics, it is the exposure of different forms of revisionists and six mountains’ lackeys and strengthening propaganda etc.

Task of lower levels:

Different lower levels have own ideological, organizational, military, political and other works. For instance: plan for operation of national enemy, economic operation, propaganda etc.

They have to discuss the central task given by higher levels and own tasks and arrange the order of own works by keeping central task intact.

In light of the above points, we reviewed some experience.

Recently, one of our regions planned for annihilation of two national enemies (two brothers) and collection money from them.

The two national enemies were creating obstacles in local work. The decision was taken to carry operation on them by adjusting it properly with the central order of solving economic problem, which is the central task in military field.

But right at the moment of starting for operation, information came that the two enemies were not at home. So, the operation was canceled because if it was carried in absence of the enemies, later, it would be difficult to find them again.

If operation was carried in absence of them, financial problem would be solved and two arms could be collected.

The following error was committed due to cancelation of operation:

By canceling operation at the last moment, it was forgotten that solving of financial problem was the principal task, and on the other hand, task of national enemy annihilation was regarded as main task. Though, solving of economic problem was regarded principal in plan, it became secondary in action.

Therefore, operation should have been carried despite the absence of national enemies and their arms and valuable goods should have been seized.

It would make financial benefit and arms-seizure for party and principal task would be put emphasis principally in real sense.

Another one national enemy was targeted for operation. On the basis of information, the news came that he had enough money.

The leadership of that region gave responsibility to subordinate cadres to carry that operation and made them prepared a list of guerrillas to participate in it. His/her subordinate cadres carried operation according to their individual wishes; failed to bring money despite national enemy was annihilated.

In that case, the leadership of region should have carried the operation under own care as it falls under central task (that is, falls under solving financial problem).

Here, leadership of that region did not grasp central task.

In another case, a plan was taken to carry a bank operation. Even guerrillas were brought from outside. But the operation was canceled due to sickness of manager.

In this case, they should have waited until the manager is cured. In this case, work was not firmly grasped.

Consequently, financial problem was not solved, that is, main problem was not solved. That is, the main problem was not firmly grasped. That is, main problem was not grasped at all.

○ Give tasks to guerrillas, party-committees and study circles by grasping central task-the solving of financial problem as principal task in military field, arrange local military works accordingly, combine rectification campaign and anti-clique struggle with that and carry propaganda.

For example: Gather guerrillas for operation plan, before operation, take class regarding anti-clique struggle and rectification campaign for several hours and then, carry discussion about operation.

The ideological preparation of operation will be anti-clique struggle and rectification movement.

Shall we raise fund with the seizure of money and other valuable goods of national enemy and agro goods?

Our some cadres, organizers and leadership of various levels have idea that people will not think the seizure of above mentioned goods of enemy as political operation but misunderstand as decoity. Or we should distribute those among people so that people do not misunderstand.

A revolutionary party is needed to carry people towards revolution. Money is needed to carry that party forward.

That money will mainly come from enemies (As exploited and plundered from people, enemy’s money is actually people’s money).

Government’s money is also people’s money.

Therefore, the seizure and use of that money for the liberation of people is justified.

Therefore, it is justified to seize enemy’s riches and money and first using it to carry forward party.

Beyond party’s necessity, the riches of national enemies should be distributed to people. But the need of party to carry forward its activities must be given prominence. Lands of national enemies have to be distributed freely among agricultural workers and poor peasants.

In 1971, in Gaurnadi region, several thousand mounds rice and wheat was collected. If that was sold in cheap price, party’s fund problem would be solved. But that was distributed among people.

Carry propaganda through poster, leaflet and wall writing so that people do not misunderstand, and people should be informed that, this and that monies and riches were collected in operation, and those are being used in carrying party activities.

People want liberation. They want revolution and revolutionary party. Therefore, they will support it.

Moreover, enemy-propaganda that we are CIA, this or that will be proved wrong because our funds come from our own initiative, not from foreign.

There is no such thing that we cannot inform people.

People will think it decoity means that we do not have trust on people.

People will understand if we propagate among them that money is needed for revolutionary party and that will come from seizure of enemy’s possessions.

It is applicable to government monies and possessions.

Therefore, we have to seize enemy and government monies and assets and inform people that party is using those assets to carry people forward to revolution.

Method:

○ Regional organizer will inform each of his/her cadre through circular the necessity of money for party and that it is the central task in military field.

○ They, as well as sympathizers also should be said to send investigation of national enemies and government institution where operation can be carried to solve financial problems.

○ Regional leadership will review investigations, determine targets and arrange serially.

Plan-making, operation and its later works

To make operation, form guerrilla group, collect arms, manage transport for operation, appoint guerrilla commander, assistant commander, political commissar in operation, fix each one’s role in operation, discuss that with guerrillas, make them understand that, appoint courier and collect information via them till the last moment. If possible, show target of operation to commanders and commissars. If place of operation is unknown to guerrillas, manage such people who are familiar with or local people, determine how guerrillas will disperse after operation, manage the system of collecting and keeping seized goods, manage system of sheltering arms, treatment of wounded and transfer of the deads.

Fix date, gathering point and time of operation etc.

○ Carry important operation under own care and grasp that.

○ If there is question of solving financial problem, carry operation regardless of presence of national enemy.

○ If national enemy becomes available, annihilate him too.

○ Carry operations continuously on the basis of information.

○ If some risk to be taken, take that too.

○ Do not let operation to be carried without the approval of regional leadership, that is, apply centralism until various guerrilla groups or leadership of areas are well trained.

○ Properly collect seized goods and send money and valuable goods to higher levels.

○ If necessary, take all sorts of assistance from other regions.

○ Provide propaganda and give slogan in the name of party, program and leadership. If possible, use chunga (domestic handmike—Sarbaharapath) or hand mike.

Use leaflet, poster and wall writing later.

○ Carry rectification campaign and anti-clique struggle in course of operation.

○ In no way it is allowed to abandon principle due to financial difficulties, that is, in no way can anyone attack on people. If there is such attack, party will lose goodwill, its relation to people will hamper, cadres will have harmful habit of attacking here and there without determining enemy and ally, and enemy will gain from it.

In early 1970, such type of event happened in Barisal resulting damage of party’s good name and party suffered losses.

○ When making plan of national enemy annihilation, create habit of marking operation target, guerrilla position, terrain, transport way by drawing map.

Teach how to read compass in this course.

These will be helpful for future.

Forming Operation Troops

1. Some have such type idea that those who were lumpen in the past, are very much brave. Lumpens use to monger big phrases. Our experiences show that they are the one who fly first, fear and break morale of guerrillas. They are very much harmful. Operation should reject those.

Experiences further show that those who were not lumpen, are good as guerrilla.

Guerrillas should be recruited generally by reviewing their obedience, spirit, pre and post party-joining activities.

2. In guerrilla troops, it is better to take some new guerrillas apart from those who are old or participated in one more operations.

Of course, it is better to take experienced ones to important operation.

In first case, new ones get chance to be experienced.

3. In case where there is no old experienced, operation troops will have to be formed by reviewing political standard, class base, spirit, past life, post party-joining activities. They will be experienced through operation.

○ When forming troops, keep in mind so that operations do not become dependent on a single person. If so, and if his/her ideological standard is low, he/she may lose sense. He/she may thinks himself/herself big thing or chief or ego may arise in him/her, he/she may be arrogant. Those bad mentalities being increased may create mentality of dishonoring party and people and non-confidence to them.

Its end will be serious like Fazlu clique.

○ Appoint a commander, an assistant commander and political commissar to the guerrilla troop, make them prepare with their responsibility.

Big type of operation may need many guerrillas. Then, in whole operation, it may need two, three, five or more guerrillas for each responsibility. Then, appoint commander, assistant commander for particular guerrillas for each work, and commander, assistant commander and political commissar for all the guerrillas.

Commando Troop:

By forming commando troop, they can be fixed some particular targets. They will carry operation by whatever weapons they find domestically around. Sometimes, if necessary, without weapon, they will carry operation by hand or towel.

They can be provided revolver, pistol, dagger, stain and grenade to use as weapon.

In front 2 in Barisal, such a troop had captured a police outpost only by blade.

In Mehendiganj area, such a troop captured a police station by an iron umbrella, a pencil and a dagger, and also they annihilated a Dofadar (Village Police—Sarbaharapath) in front of Razakars [Razakar was an pro Pakistan infamous genocidal Islamist militia specially made by Pak military bandits—Sarbaharapath). Recently such a troop annihilated several national enemies in empty hand.

Special Troops:

Sometimes, special troops can be formed who are kept ready day-night for operation.

This type of troop is needed when operation may happen anytime.

For that, manage 24 hours shelter and food for specific number of guerrillas.

Such a step was taken recently during the time of anti-clique struggle. After the task is finished, special troop is dismissed.

○ Do not go with a single stain gun in important operation because sometimes stain gets jammed.

Recently, such an event happened in Barisal and Rijvi escaped.

○ Use at least two stain.

○ Do not use two hand grenades in important operation because all the two may not explode. Recently in a very much important operation, all the two grenades have not exploded.

For that, fuse of hand grenade should be dried in sunlight (not in fire) prior to operation, and go with at least three hand grenades.

○ Keep seriously caution when making and carrying domestic hand bombs. Domestic hand bombs should be made in a place where there is no people.

The maker should not be leading or promising cadre. When carrying, keep safe distance and leading or promising cadres shall not carry.

Promising cadre like comrade Shahin was killed when making hand bomb and several others were injured.

Similar incidence happened in Chittagong too.

○ To break national enemy’s door, axe or Gad should be used.

To break Sinduk (vault), use five ser hammer and chisel.

At last, if necessary, charge grenade.

○ Keep and use revolver, pistol, stain gun, breta etc smaller automatic weapons with very much care. It must be taken care that those are not lost.

It is applicable to all types of automatic weapons.

Some experience regarding operation

“To solve economic problem is the central task in military field”

According to the above mentioned order of central committee, step was taken to investigate, decide and materialize decision regarding operation on national enemy Nagar Mullah. On the basis of investigation, troop was made; commander, assistant commander, political commissar and scout were appointed, troop members were made ready with responsibility; transport, shelter and shelter for seized weapons etc. were fixed. In first initiative, enemy was not at the spot, so troop retreated (financial problem could not be solved in absence of enemy). Several days later, again step was taken. But several serious errors occurred in course of operation although enemy was annihilated.

○ After gathered on operation spot, huge time was killed, talked suspiciously, moved here and there and showed vacillation in taking decision.

One reason was that enemy was not at the place where he was presumed to be, but actually he was in another point. Second reason was that a lot of people’s gathering was at the operation spot. It is to mention that operation place was a huge populated weekly market place (Hat).

The commander should have solved the first problem rapidly. At best he could take help from assistant commander and from political commissar, if they were present. But in no way he/she should kill time on spot or take decision by discussing with guerrillas.

If he/she fails to take rapid decision, he/she must leave spot instantly, retreat to safe place, have discussion there and take decision.

The problem of huge gathering of people could be solved by proper command.

So, in first situation, by knowing enemy position through scout, and not being afraid of people’s gathering, rapid decision should have been taken and enemy should have been attacked. As a result of making late, enemy might have escaped or guerrilla troops might have been caught as decoit. In this case, commander failed to play own role. This is why certain guerrilla didn’t wait for commander’s order in next time when enemy was available in proper place and attacked the enemy. Without the spirit of that guerrilla, troops would not have been able to catch the enemy.

○ Main thing is that in any situation, vacillation in taking decision on spot may inflict serious danger. As soon as vacillation arises, instantly leave spot.

○ Troop failed to solve economic problem as a whole. In this case too, the reason is the failure of commander and assistant commander to give order. With starting attack, Commander should have commanded guerrillas with raising his/her voice, to search enemy’s shop and rice mill. Moreover, had command properly given, enemy could be arrested alive and money could be collected. But it could not happen due to lack of proper command. In place of commander, the assistant commander could not carry that responsibility. Commander and assistant commander forgot the order that ‘solving financial problem is the principal task’.

The responsibility of searching shop and rice mill was distributed among guerrillas beforehand, but they also failed to carry that.

As a whole, the troop could not implement its central task in action.

○ Because of lack of proper command and carrying almost a spontaneous attack, certain guerrilla unnecessarily fired many bullets.

Where a single bullet was not needed to spend, he spent 35 bullets. It is totally against the principle of being economical and also against central order. Central committee forbade to unnecessarily misuse even a single bullet.

○ Another comrade unnecessarily and without command misused a bullet and took step to misuse another one while retreating, but he was stopped by the order of certain guerrilla. As people did not make any barricade while retreating, so it was unnecessary to make any sound. Doing such things may cause danger. Enemy may follow us by following sound. So, while retreat, troop should return silently as far as possible. Do not have any discussion even, let alone about any error. Discuss about errors and other matters by gathering in safe place.

Spending bullet unnecessarily and without order of commander is manifestation of giving prominence of weapons and thrilling. Both the two is seriously harmful in war.

Moreover, despite having training of how to use stain gun, that guerrilla became confused when the stain gun was not working in his hand.

The meaning of being confused in war is bringing danger for own. This is why brain should always be kept cool. Sometimes, magazine’s spring gets loose, so it does not work properly (so, bullet should be kept outside magazine except time of action). Sometimes, bolt also does not work properly. In such difficulties, keep your head cool, rapidly change magazine and pull bolt again. You should be mentally prepared for that. But that will not be possible if prominence is given to weapons and you will get confused.

○ In plan, how much time the boat transport will take, was not estimated before. Consequently, troop had to wait long time in boat. In this regard, information based investigation should have been emphasized.

○ Good aspects of the operation are that it was the first operation in that area, national enemy was successfully annihilated, guerrillas were gathered timely, scout correctly played his/her role, speech was delivered in spot, present people was acknowledged about party leadership and position of party through slogan and the troop received huge people’s support.

But in the operation, our loss was principal aspect due to failure of solving financial problem and spending much more bullets unnecessary.

►◄

For another attack, a commando troop was formed by guerrillas with two stain gun, guide and scout. The place of operation was in city and important. In action, commandos successfully attacked. But initially, stain could fire bullets but failed to brush. It happened to the first commando, so, he/she was confused. The second commando attacked with stain gun, but no firing occurred at all. It made the first commando more confused. In this case, main problem was that commandos did not have good grasp of weapon and full-fledged knowledge on tactics. So, they got confused. They should have changed magazine, repeatedly pull bolt and set safety case correctly.

○ Fortunately, enemy was annihilated at the first phase. As commandos were not sure about that, they failed to chant slogan in the name of leadership and party.

○ In the operation, two hand bombs were ordered to throw, but first one has not exploded after throwing, while particular person failed to throw the second one. Because of falling damp, hand bombs do not explode. Therefore, hand bombs should be made several days before any important operation and dry in sunlight properly.

○ After the operation, the guide of operation became afraid a little bit. So, he/she did not guided commandos towards the previously fixed path, though it was possible. He became abnormal a little bit and guided commandos toward abnormal unknown path. Thus, passing by such a path could create suspicion and commandos could get in danger in a special situation when they might need to disperse on their own in an unknown path.

In this case, brave and experienced cadres should be appointed as guide.

○ As a whole, error of this operation is not deeply thinking the post operation condition during planning of operation.

Enemies are stronger in enemy areas. Therefore, they can rapidly communicate there, increase strength, impose curfew, carry search etc. But these were not considered in operation. One of the reasons was that local administration had serious hatred to enemy. But though local administration was inactive, higher administration rapidly communicated and deployed extra force there and became able to impose curfew, carry massive search and arrest (Of course, we did not have any losses because of our vigilance)

○ Therefore, take proper caution when carrying important operations in cities. Papers and arms should be transferred to safe place beforehand. Send those cadres outside who are exposed and make shelter for operation troop at the outskirt of city. If it is difficult to carry weapons, keep it under ground in safe shelter in the very city. If that is also not possible, keep it under water. For that, preparation is needed before operation. Especially in Thana and sub-divisional towns (where enemy’s communication is developed), this method must be applied. Though not massive, enemy can impose curfew and carry search in particular areas. Manage shelter, arms and papers keeping safe distance from that area.

○ In important operation, deploy good, efficient and brave guerrillas. Provide training of various weapons to gain efficiency.

○ In cities, it is advantageous to carry national enemy annihilation through commando attack. Fix operation place (one or two), manage shelter (two/three minute walking distance to that) near that where commandos being prepared will temporarily stay. Appoint scout and if necessary guide. In these types of attack, role of scout is very important. Commandos must have to be very much brave. This process can be done on the road by being mobile. Scout will give confirmed information of specific path. On that basis, commandos, by being mobile, will attack. If enemy is unknown to commandos, make them know before. Make them familiar to unknown roads, markets and shelters.

In such attack, revolver, stain under body cover sheet and dagger can be used. But commandos should not stay long with heavy weapons (stain gun) in open public.

Note:

1)      Quotation, P 258, Document on Organizational Work